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NOTICE REQUIREMENTS: FEDERAL
PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL PLANT
CLOSING STATUTES
I. Introduction
In an attempt to ease the burden placed on employees by the
sudden, unannounced closing of their workplaces, several states' and
cities2 throughout the United States have passed "plant closing stat-
utes." 3 These statutes contain provisions which set specific time
periods within which employers must give notice of an impending
factory or plant closing to at least one of the following: the em-
ployees, unions, government officials in the city or county affected
or the state director of labor. 4
1. These states are Maine, Massachusetts, South Carolina and Wisconsin. See
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 625-B(6-A) (West Supp. 1984-1985), MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 149, § 182 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1984-1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-I-
40 (Law. Co-op. 1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 109.07 (West Supp. 1984-1985). Similar
statutes are pending in a number of states including New York's Assembly Bill
9538 (207th Sess. 1984). See infra note 147 for a listing of these states. See generally
New York Times, July 12, 1984, at A21, col. 3 (discussing pending plant closing
statutes).
2. These cities include Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
and Vacaville, California. See PHILADELPHIA, PA. CODE tit. 9, ch. 9-1502(1); Pitts-
burgh, Pa. Ordinance 21 (1983); Vacaville, Cal. Ordinance 1200 (Jan. 24, 1984).
The Pittsburgh statute has since been declared unconstitutional. See infra notes
176-91 and accompanying text for discussion of the Pittsburgh statute.
3. Plant closing statutes, both actual and proposed, deal with the statutory
obligations of employers who intend to relocate or close a plant or factory. See
infra note 4 for discussion of these obligations. These statutes require firms to
"give as much as two years notice of any intention to move" and in some cases
"impose tax penalties on firms that move without adequate justification." McKenzie,
Business Mobility. Economic Myths and Realities in PLANT CLOSINGS: PUBLIC OR
PRIVATE CHOICES? at 11-12 (R. McKenzie ed. 1984). Such statutes may also include
provisions mandating worker's "severance pay for up to a year and ... institu-
tionalizing federal government bailouts of ailing firms." McKenzie, The Right to
Close Up Shop in PLANT CLOSINGS: PUBLIC OR PRIVATE CHOICES? at 4 (R. McKenzie
ed. 1984).
4. Cf. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 625-B(6-A) (West Supp. 1984-1985)
("[any person proposing to relocate a covered establishment outside the state shall
notify employees, and the municipal officers of the municipality where the plant
is located..."); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 182 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1984-
1985) ("in the event of a plant closing or partial closing . . . the company agrees
to make good-faith effort to provide every employee affected with ... at least
ninety days notice"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-40 (Law Co-op. 1977) ("[all employers
of labor in this State requiring notice from any employee of the time such employee
will quit work shall give notice to its employees of its purpose to quit work or
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Through these laws, state and local legislative bodies have joined
the federal government in dealing with the notice issue. Specifically,
section 8(a)(5)5 of the Taft-Hartley Act 6 requires that a company
give a union reasonable notice of a decision to close in order that
meaningful bargaining may be undertaken.' Congress has vested in
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)s the authority to review
shutdown. ); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 109.07 (West Supp. 1984-1985) ("[elvery
employer employing 100 or more persons in this state who has decided upon a
merger, liquidation, disposition or relocation within or without the state, resulting
in a cessation of business operations affecting employes shall promptly notify the
department [of industry, labor and human relations]); PHILADELPHIA, PA. CODE
tit. 9, ch. 9-1502(1) ("[wlhenever an employer within the City of Philadelphia
makes a decision to close or relocate the operations of an establishment of that
employer, the employer shall notify in writing the Director of Commerce of the
City of Philadelphia, the employees of the affected establishment, and any employee
organization which represents the employees").
5. Originally section 8(5), 29 U.S.C. § .151-166 (1935), this section became
section 8(a)(5) with the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1982),
in 1947. See infra note 6 for further history of the NLRA.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1982). The official title of the act is the National Labor
Relations Act. The Wagner Act distinguishes the provisions of this original 1935
legislation from the present NLRA which incorporates provisions of the Wagner
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1982), passed in 1935, the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947,
29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-167, 171-187 (1982) and the Landrum-Griffith Act passed
in 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 158-160, 164, 186-187, 401-402, 411-415, 431-441, 461-
466, 481-483, 501-504, 521-531 (1982). The NLRA is aimed at providing and
protecting employees rights to organize, bargain collectively and engage in peaceful
strikes and picketing. A. Cox, D. C. BOK & R. A. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LABOR LAW 74 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Cox, BOK & GORMAN]. Section 8(5)
insures the employees right to collective bargaining through their elected represen-
tatives. Id.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1982).
8. The NLRB was created under sections 3 and 4 of the Wagner Act, 29
U.S.C. § 153 (1982). Section 10 of the act regulates NLRB procedure in dealing
with unfair labor cases. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982). The Board consists of five members,
appointed by the President and approved by the Senate. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1982).
The members serve staggered, five-year terms. Id.
The Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA created the office of the General
Counsel. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1982). Appointed by the President and subject to
Senate approval, the General Counsel serves a four-year term. Id. The General
Counsel investigates unfair labor practice charges and issues complaints when in-
vestigations indicate such practices may exist. Id. In addition, the General Counsel
represents the Board in court proceedings to enforce or review Board decisions.
Id. To further assist the NLRB, regional offices have been created to review Board
decisions, investigate charges, conduct elections and prosecute complaints. 29 U.S.C.
§ 153(b) (1982).
Specifically, the Board and its staff focus on cases involving alleged breaches
of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982). These include unfair labor practice
claims, representation cases and rulings on the appropriateness of proposed bar-
gaining units. Cox, BoK & GORMAN, supra note 6, at 89. Jurisdiction of the Board
is statutorily limited to those businesses whose activities affect interstate commerce.
Id. In order to lessen its case load, the Board voluntarily has declined to assume
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claims regarding employer closings or relocations undertaken without
prior notice to employees or their representatives. 9
This dual existence of state and federal legislation in the notice
area implicates the validity of state and local statutes in light of
the federal preemption doctrine. 10 This Note examines the general
application of the preemption doctrine especially in the labor relations
field and then applies the doctrine, specifically, to plant closing
statutes. The Note then examines the invalidity of state and local
statutes in light of the doctrine and concludes with a discussion of
the status of federal legislation on the notice issue.
II. The Federal Preemption Doctrine
A. Development of the Doctrine
The preemption doctrine" is invoked under the supremacy clause
jurisdiction over employers not meeting certain income levels. Id. For example, a
non-retail firm must have a least a $50,000 interstate annual volume of flow. Id.
Following the refusal of an employer or union to comply with an order of the
Board, under section 10(e) the Board may petition the United States Court of
Appeals for enforcement of'the Board's decision. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1982). Under
section 10(f) a person seeking review of the Board's final order may obtain such
from an appropriate circuit court of appeals. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1982). This court
may either enforce the order, remand it to the Board for further consideration,
modify it or set it aside. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1982). Failure to comply with a court
order enforcing the Board's order may result in a fine or imprisonment for contempt.
Cox, BOK & GORMAN, supra note 6, at 112. See generally id. at 88-90, 104-13;
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, NLRB, A GUIDE TO BASIC LAW AND PROCEDURES
UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 44-54 (1978); B. WERNE, NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT AND MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
1-51 (1956) [hereinafter cited as WERNE] for summaries of NLRB structure and
operation. The preemption issue dealt with in this Note is concerned with those
parties covered by the NLRA. Such coverage exists where an enterprise's activities
affect commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1982) ("[ilt is the purpose and policy of
this chapter, in order to promote the full flow of commerce, to prescribe the
legitimate rights of both employees and employers in their relations affecting
commerce . . ."). This is a broad requirement. For example, wheat used exclusively
on the farm where it was grown affects interstate commerce by reducing the national
volume. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). Nevertheless, "it is probable
that not much more than half of the total labor force in the United States is
covered by the NLRA." Cox, BOK & GORMAN, supra note 6, at 88.
9. "[Tihe Board may reasonably interpret § 8(a)(5), as explicated in § 8(d),
as requiring an employer relocating his plant ... to give reasonable notice to a
recognized union . . . ." Cooper Thermometer v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 684, 688 (2d
Cir. 1967). See infra notes 109-24 and accompanying text for further discussion
of this interpretation of § 8(a)(5).
10. See infra notes 12-15 and accompanying text for definition of preemption
doctrine. This Note specifically is concerned with those corporations which, by
virtue of a union labor contract, are subject to NLRB jurisdiction. See supra note
8 for discussion of NLRB jurisdiction.
11. Doctrine adopted by U.S. Supreme Court holding that certain matters
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of the Constitution. 2 Reflecting a desire for uniformity of laws in
areas of national concern,' 3 the preemption doctrine provides that
when Congress exercises its legislative powers, similar state legislation
may be rendered invalid.14
Judicial action in this area has been concerned basically with
deciding whether congressional intent requires the invalidation of
state or local laws which might interfere with federal regulations.,5
are of such national, as opposed to local, character that federal laws
pre-empt or take precedence over state laws. As such, a state may not
pass a law inconsistent with the federal law. Examples are federal laws
governing interstate commerce.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1060 (5th ed. 1979).
12. This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
13. See Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, 405 U.S.
707, 720-21 (1972) (national uniformity is necessity in some fields including regulation
of air transportation due to interstate effects); Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul,
373 U.S. 132, 143-44 (1963) (exclusive federal regulation indicated for subject matter,
such as interstate commerce regulation, which by its very nature admits "only of
national supervision"); Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 300-02 (1961) (where
federal regulatory areas demand uniform standards state laws which complement
federal regulatory scheme are preempted).
14. "[W]here the federal government, in the exercise of its superior authority
in this field, has enacted a complete scheme of regulation . . . states cannot,
inconsistently with the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or
complement, the federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary regulations." Hines
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1941); see also Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n
v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) ("[e]ven where Congress has not
completely displaced state regulation in a specific area, state law is nullified to the
extent it actually conflicts with federal law"); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435
U.S. 151, 158 (1978) ("[elven if Congress has not completely foreclosed state
legislation in a particular area, a state statute is void to the extent that it actually
conflicts with a valid federal statute"); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963) (where state and federal legislation conflict so that
obedience to one requires defiance of other, or where there is evinced a federal
design to sole occupation of field, state jurisdiction must yield); Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 235-36 (1947) (where Congress has assumed full and
exclusive control in given regulatory area, there is no room for state legislation in
that area); County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 728 F.2d 52, 57 (2d
Cir. 1984) (preemption may be caused by express Congressional action, conflict
between state and federal law, state or local statutes impeding execution of Congres-
sional aims or state legislation undertaken in areas fully occupied by federal
regulation).
15. "The constitutional principles of pre-emption, in whatever particular field
of the law they operate, are designed with a common end in view: to avoid
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As determination of congressional intent is elusive, the applicability
of the preemption doctrine is similarly elusive. i 6
Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has formulated a
number of tests for proper application of the doctrine. 7 In Hines
v. Davidowitz,"s the test for determining whether congressional action
preempted state legislation was whether the state law "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress."' 9 Thus, in Hines, where Congress
already had enacted a complete regulatory scheme applicable to alien
registration, a Pennsylvania statute adding registration requirements
was held invalid under the federal preemption doctrine.20
Over the course of a decade, 2' the preemption test developed into
conflicting regulation of conduct by various official bodies which might have some
authority over the subject matter." Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor
Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1971); see supra note 14
and accompanying text.
16. There is not-and from the very nature of the problem there cannot
be-any rigid formula or rule which can be used as a universal pattern
to determine the meaning and purpose of every act of Congress .... In
the final analysis there can be no one crystal clear distinctly marked
formula.
Hines, 312 U.S. at 67; see also City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc.,
411 U'S. 624, 638 (1973) ("[olur prior cases on pre-emption are not precise guidelines
in the present controversy, for each case turns on the peculiarities and special
features of the federal regulatory scheme in question"); J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA
& J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 293 (1978) ("[w]hile the touchstones invoked
by the Court can be delineated succinctly, there is no simplistic constitutional
standard for defining preemption parameters"); Note, The Preemption Doctrine:
Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623,
624 (1975) ["Supreme Court .. .has not developed a uniform approach to preemp-
tion; its decisions in this area take on an ad hoc, unprincipled quality, seemingly
bereft of any consistent doctrinal basis"] [hereinafter cited as Shifting Perspectives].
17. See infra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
18. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
19. Id. at 67.
20. Id. at 73-74.
21. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947). Here the
Court found that by means of amendments to sections 6 and 29 of the U.S.
Warehouse Act (39 Stat. 486 as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 241 (1982)) Congress assumed
full and exclusive control over the regulation of warehouses licensed under the
federal act. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. at 229-30. As a result, an
Illinois statute undertaking regulation of the same area was superseded by the
federal regulation.
This case is a fine example of the preemption test's development as the Courts'
analysis included three steps: 1) the "broad scheme of federal regulation leaving
no room for local action" approach seen in Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson,
315 U.S. 148, 156 (1942) (through the Internal Revenue Code § 2325 federal
government has so totally occupied regulatory field of renovated butter manufacture
19851
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the three-pronged inquiry set forth in Pennsylvania v. Nelson.22 In
Nelson, the Court deemed it necessary to consider: (1) the perva-
siveness of the federal regulatory scheme; 23 (2) the degree of federal
occupation of the field necessitated by the need for national uni-
formity;24 and (3) the danger of conflict between state laws and the
administration of the federal program. 25 Application of this test in
Nelson resulted in the invalidation of a Pennsylvania Sedition Act
which sought to proscribe the same conduct as that covered by the
federal Smith Act. 26
Finally, in Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,27
the Court announced a succinct yet vague standard. The Court stated
that in applying the doctrinal test, the major factors for consideration
were either "actual conflict between the two schemes of regulation
[so] that both cannot stand in the same area, [or] evidence of a
congressional design to preempt the field." ' 28 The Court further held
that state statutes attempting to regulate same area are preempted); 2) the preclusion
of state action in areas deemed necessarily reserved for exclusive federal occupation,
as noted in Hines v. Davidowitz, supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text; and
3) the belief that a state rule which produces a result inconsistent with federal
objectives must bow to the federal regulation stated in Hill v. Florida ex rel.
Watson, 325 U.S. 538, 539 (1945) (Florida statute regulating who may serve as
labor union representative and further regulating labor union activities found to
be in "irreconcilable conflict with the NLRA and thus invalid under the preemption
doctrine").
22. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
23. If Congress had implemented a broad scheme of federal regulation it might
be reasonable to infer a congressional intent to control the field exclusively. Id.
at 502-04; see also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)
("[t]he scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it"); Cloverleaf
Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 156 (1942) ("prohibition of state action is
* . . inferable from the scope and purpose of the federal legislation").
24. If the subject matter, by its nature, is one of national concern, Congressional
action may be deemed to evince a desire for national uniformity, thus prohibiting
state legislation in the field. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. at 504-05; see also
Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707,
720-21 (1972) (airport imposition of $1.00 per passenger service charge, money
going toward improvement and maintenance of airport, held valid as charge did
not conflict with "federal policies furthering uniform national regulation of air
transportation"); Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 300-01 (1961) (see infra notes
34-41 and accompanying text for futher discussion of this case).
25. Nelson, 350 U.S. at 505-09; see also Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 543
(1945).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1982). The Act prohibits the knowing advocacy of the
overthrow of the United States government by force or violence.
27. 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
28. Id. at 141. For a more detailed discussion of the Preemption Doctrine and
the complexities accompanying its continuing growth, see Hirsh, Toward a New
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that a California agricultural statute 9 which differea in definition
from a similar federal statute was nonetheless valid as there was:
(1) no actual conflict between the federal and state statutes; (2) no
indication of congressional design to preempt the field and; (3) no
inevitable collision of the state and federal regulations.30 How far
the barriers of "conflict" will extend or how to evince a clear notion
of congressional design has been left to a case-by-case judicial de-
termination.'
Application of the preemption doctrine is not limited to instances
where state or local laws are in direct conflict with federal statutes.32
Preemption questions also arise when state or local statutes purport
to complement federal action. 3 Campbell V. Hussey 4 dealt with a
conflict between federal legislation and a seemingly complementary
state statute. Campbell involved the Federal Tobacco Inspection Act35
View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L. F. 515; Shifting Perspectives, supra
note 16; Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction,
12 STAN. L. REV. 208 (1959).
29. 373 U.S. 132, 133-34 (1963). The statute, section 792 of the California
Agricultural Code, representing a legislative attempt to regulate the sale of Florida-
grown avocados in California, provided a definition of a "mature" avocado which
differed from the federal definition supplied by the Federal Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act of 1937. 7 U.S.C. §§ 601, 602, 608a, 608c, 610, 612, 671-674
(1982).
30. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 141-46. It must be noted,
however, that the Court's holding relied on the fact that the regulated area was
one traditionally controlled by the states. See infra notes 140-41 and accompanying
text for discussion of historic state powers.
31. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
32. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
33. Id.; see also Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 544-45 (1949) (claim
that state laws supplement federal regulations of milk industry rejected where
supplemental effect ran counter to federal regulatory scheme); Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947) (federal regulation of warehouses is
exclusive, state laws in the area are thus invalid "even though they in no way
conflicted with what was demanded .. . under the Federal Act"); Missouri Pac.
R. R. v. Porter, 273 U.S. 341, 346 (1927) (federal regulations are supreme; state
laws "cannot be applied in coincidence with, as complementary to or as in opposition
to, federal enactments"); Breeden, Federalism and the Development of Outer Con-
tinental Shelf Mineral Resources, 28 STA. L. REV. 1107, 1145 (1976) (Supreme
Court has most "readily found ... [state law] inconsistency or interference ...
[with federal law] when Congress has specifically provided that even harmonious
state law shall be of no effect, when the Court infers such an intent from the
comprehensiveness of particular federal legislation, or when the Court determines
that the subject matter demands exclusive federal regulation in order to achieve
uniformity vital to national interests").
34. 368 U.S. 297 (1961).
35. 7 U.S.C. § 511 (1982).
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which contained the requirement of a blue ticket on "type 14"
tobac co.36 A Georgia statute attempted to classify the tobacco further
by adding a white tag requirement on type 14 tobacco grown in
Georgia.17 In holding that the federal act preempted the state statute,
the Court relied,38 in part, on its determination that in this case
"federal law excludes local regulation, even though the latter does
no more than supplement the former."3 9 In this situation, "com-
plementary state regulation is as fatal as state regulations which
conflict with the federal scheme."" Thus, although there was no
direct conflict between the two statutes, the Court found that Con-
gress' intent to occupy this regulatory field on an exclusive basis
invalidated additional state regulation in the same field. 41
B. The Application of the Preemption Doctrine to the
Labor Field
The Supreme Court's basic approach in applying the federal
preemption doctrine42 to labor law cases is explained in Hill v.
Florida.43 Hill involved a Florida statute which specified qualifications
for service as a union representative. 44 The statute also generally
36. Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. at 300 (construing Federal Tobacco Inspection
Act § 511, 7 C.F.R. § 29.1144 (1961)). Type 14 tobacco is defined by the Department
of Agriculture as " 'that type of flue-cured tobacco commonly known as Southern
Flue-cured or New Belt of Georgia, Florida, and Alabama, produced principally
in the southern section of Georgia and to some extent in Florida and Alabama.'
7 C.F.R., 1961 Cum. Supp. § 29.1100." Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. at 299-
300.
37. Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. at 298 (construing 1960 Ga. Laws 557).
38. Other bases for the Court's holding were: 1) federal law mandates one
official, nationally uniform tobacco classification, id. at 300, and 2) complete
federal occupation of the field. Id. at 301.
39. Id. at 302.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 301-02.
42. The doctrine of preemption basically precludes the assertion of juris-
diction by state courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies over labor
relations issues and controversies effectively controlled by the NLRA.
The scope of the subject matter preempted by the NLRA and thereby
withdrawn from state power is not, however, clearly definable. The NLRA
and its amendments do not completely preempt all authority in the labor
relations field, but the remaining state jurisdiction has not been quantified.
10 Employment Coordinator (Research Instit. of America) LR-12,261.1 (1984).
43. 325 U.S. 538 (1945). The Florida Attorney General filed bill for injunction
against the union and its agent, Hill, seeking to restrain their functioning until
they complied with the Florida statute regulating union representation. Id. at 538-
39.
44. Id. at 538-39. Florida required that business agents of unions must be U.S.
citizens for greater than ten years, never convicted of a felony and be of good
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regulated labor unionization activities.. Since these labor issues
already had been the subject of federal legislation 4 6 the Florida
statute was found to be in "irreconcilable conflict with the collective
bargaining regulations of the National Labor Relations Act ' 47 and,
therefore, was declared invalid by the Court. 41
Cases dealing with the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)49
and the preemption doctrine generally recognize the singular authority
of the NLRB over the development of law in the labor relations
field5° in keeping with the perceived congressional desire for nttional
moral character. 1943 Fla. Laws 21,968,565. In addition, application for license
must be made, fee paid and application approved. Id. Neither Hill nor the union
made such application furnishing the basis for the action by the state.
45. 325 U.S. at 540.
46. These issues were dealt with by the Wagner Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166
(1982)), the declared purpose of which is to "encourage collective bargaining, and
to protect the 'full freedom' of workers in the selection of bargaining representatives
of their own choice." Hill, 325 U.S. at 541.
47. Hill, 325 U.S. at 539.
48. Id. at 543-44.
49. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982). The NLRA represents Congress' attempt to
aid unionization, an attempt derived from the search for ways to bring the country
out of the depression which followed the stock market crash of 1929. Cox, BOK
& GORMAN, supra note 6, at 73. The Act, passed in 1935, sought to equalize the
bargaining power of employers and employees by aiding the establishment of
employee unions. B. ZEPKE, LABOR LAW 8 (1977). The office of the General Counsel
of the NLRB (see supra note 8 for powers of the NLRB) states the purpose of
the Act is to "define and protect the rights of employees and employers, to
encourage collective bargaining and to eliminate certain practices on the part of
labor and management that are harmful to the general welfare." OFFICE OF THE
GENERAL COUNSEL, NLRB, A GUIDE TO BASIC LAW AND PROCEDURES UNDER THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1 (1978).
The NLRA was amended in 1947 by the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-
Hartley Act) (see supra note 8 for additional discussion of this act) which sought
to further the employer-employee equalization process. Through this amendment
Congress sought to limit the power of the unions which had flourished since 1935
by repealing provisions of the 1935 Act, such as the approval of closed shops
(union membership may be a condition of employment), and establishing new
sections that make unions liable for unfair labor practices. See generally Cox, BOK
& GORMAN, supra note 6, at 69-88; WERNE, supra note 8, at 1-51; B. ZEPKE,
LABOR LAW 1-9 (1977) for discussion of history and purpose of the NLRA.
50. Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lock-
ridge, 403 U.S. 274, 288-89 (1971) (Court stressed development of uniform standard
of national labor law through action of NLRB); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council
v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (see infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text for
discussion of necessity of Board's exclusive authority in development of labor law
under NLRA); Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1957) (federal
law must preempt state where latter threatens uniformity of national labor law and
development under guidance of NLRB); Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S.
485, 490 (1953) ("Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of
specially designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its
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uniformity in the area." For example, in Garner v. Teamsters Local
776,12 the Court held that a state court lacked jurisdiction to grant
an injunction to stop picketing.of the petitioner's loading platform
by the local since this activity was subject to the exclusive jurisdiction
of the NLRB.5 3 Stating that "Congress evidently considered that
centralized administration of specially designed procedures was nec-
essary to obtain uniform application of its substantive rules and to
avoid ... diversities and conflicts likely to result from a variety of
substantive rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to result from
a variety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies"); Automobile
Workers v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454, 458 (1950) (where federal and state law differ
so that state conflicts with exercise of federally protected labor rights state statute
cannot survive); Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers
Org., 667 F.2d 316, 323 (2d Cir. 1981) (recognizes need to "ensure a consistent
body of federal labor law by preempting potentially inconsistent state court ad-
judication"); NLRB v. Comm. of Interns & Residents, 566 F.2d 810, 812 (2d Cir.
1977) (federal regulation establishes need for uniform development of labor reg-
ulations overseen exclusively by NLRB).
51. See supra notes 41-56 and accompanying text for discussion of necessity of
national uniformity. See also Conrad, An Overview of the Laws of Corporations
71 MIcH. L. REv. 623, 627 (NLRA preempts inconsistent state regulations affecting
interstate commerce); Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1337, 1343 ("[s]tate divergencies in relief covering the whole range of NLRB
prohibitions would add up to highly important departures from federal policy");
Drapkin & Davis, Health and Safety Provisions in Union Contracts: Power of
Liability?, 65 MINN. L. REv. 635, 649 (1978) ("federal labor law will preempt
inconsistent state laws").
52. 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
53. Id. at 501. Four of petitioners' twenty-four employees were members of
respondent union. Petitioners had never objected to this membership, yet respondents
placed pickets at petitioners' loading platform in an apparent attempt to place
pressure on petitioners to compel or influence their other employees to join re-
spondent union. Id. at 486-87. Picketing was orderly but because a number of
delivery truck drivers were unionized they refused to cross the picket line. As a
result petitioners suffered a 95% business loss. Id. at 487. Petitioners sought relief
under the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 211.6
(1952). 346 U.S. at 486-87. However, the NLRA has undertaken regulation of this
type of union behavior:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against
an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) . . . or to discriminate
against an employee with respect to whom membership in such orga-
nization has been denied or terminated on some ground other than his
failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly
required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership . . ..
29 U.S.C § 158(b) (1982).
Subsection (a)(3) states in pertinent part, that it is an "unfair labor practice for
an employer . . . (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment
... to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization . .. ." 29
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of local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies, ' 5 4 the
Court indicated the need for federal invalidation of concurrent state
jurisdiction in the labor field in order to maintain national uni-
formity."
The seminal case in this area is San Diego Building Trades Council
v. Garmon.16 The Garmon Court held that a state court or agency
may not enjoin conduct or award damages based on actions that
are arguably subject to section 7,57 protected activity, or section 8,58
U.S.C. § 158(a) (1982). Thus, petitioners in Garner should have filed an unfair
labor practice charge with the NLRB as it alone had jurisdiction to decide the
case.
54. Garner, 346 U.S. at 490.
55. Id.; see also UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454, 457 (1950) (none of NLRA
provisions dealing with strike regulations "can be read as permitting concurrent
state regulation of peaceful strikes for higher wages. Congress occupied this field
and closed it to state regulation"); Gould, Inc. v. Wisconsin, DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) No. 248, at D-1, D-3 (Dec. 26, 1984) ("the NLRA was enacted to remedy
the varying attitudes of the states toward labor law ... [thus] [wihile recidivism
is conduct that the NLRA has chosen not to prohibit directly, Congress' failure
to do so does not necessarily imply that the remedy is thereby left to the states").
56. 359 U.S. 236 (1959). Garmon "represents the watershed in this Court's
continuing effort to mark the extent to which the maintenance of a general federal
law of labor relations combined with a centralized administrative agency to implement
its provisions necessarily supplants the operation of the more traditional legal
processes in this field." Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach
Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 276 (1971); Gudridge, The Persistence of
Classical Style, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 663, 688 n.10 (1983) ("Supreme Court opinions
characteristically treat contemporary labor law preemption doctrine as beginning
with . . . [Garmon]"); Note, The Role of State Courts in Labor Related Access
Disputes, 57 TEX. L. REV. 131, 131 (1979) (under Garmon "exclusive primary
jurisdiction vests in the [NLRBJ, withholding from state courts any controversy
even arguably subject to the [NLRA]").
57. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). Section 7 provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,
and shall have the right to refrain from any or all such activities except
to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor' organization as a condition of employment as
authorized in section 158(a)(3).
Id. See infra note 58 for discussion of § 158(a)(3).
58. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982). Section 8 lists and prohibits unfair labor practices
of employers (29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1982)) and labor organizations (29 U.S.C. §
158(b) (1982)). Under this section an employer is prohibited from interfering with
its employees' section 7 rights (29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)) (see supra note 57 for a
discussion of these rights); dominating or illegally assisting and supporting a labor
organization (29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2)); discriminating against employees in both hiring
and tenure in an effort to discourage union membership (29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3));
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prohibited activity, of the NLRA.59 Any such action by a state
court or agency is thus preempted. 60 Since Garmon, preemption has
been used to invalidate state laws which: (1) enjoin peaceful picketing
which protests substandard wages paid by ship owners whose vessels
are registered under foreign flags to American longshoremen working
American ports; 61 (2) award damages based on breach of a contractual
obligation as "embodied in a union consititution;'' 62 and (3) regulate
union hiring hall practices. 63
A determination that Congress intended a specific area to remain
unregulated and controlled only "by the free play of economic
forces" creates another basis for federal preemption of state labor
discriminating against an employee for NLRB activity (29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(4));
and refusing to bargain in good faith with a recognized employee representative
in regard to wages, hours and other conditions of employment (29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(5)).
Labor organizations are prohibited, under section 8, from restraining or coercing
employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights (29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(l)(A));
restraining or coercing an employer in its selection of a bargaining representative
(29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(l)(B)); causing or attempting to cause an employer to dis-
criminate against an employee (29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2)); refusing to bargain in good
faith in regard to wages, hours and conditions of employment (29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3));
and engaging in certain prohibited strikes or boycotts as are listed by the section
(29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i)-(b)(4)(ii)).
59. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244-45.
60. Id. ("[wihen it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which
a State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the [NLRA], or constitute an
unfair labor practice under § 8, due regard for the federal enactment requires that
state jurisdiction must yield").
61. Longshoremen's Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 195 (1970)
(arguably protected under section 7 of NLRA).
62. Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lock-
ridge, 403 U.S. 274, 293 (1971) (arguably protected under section 7 or prohibited
by section 8).
63. United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 696
(1963) (conflict with protections offered by sections 7 and 8 of NLRA); see also
Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290, 300 n.9 (1976) (explaining
Borden); International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers v.
Perko, 373 U.S. 701, 707-08 (1963) (state preempted from awarding damages to
union member alleging union tortiously deprived him of right to work). For other
decisions dealing with the. arguably protected/prohibited standard established by
Garmon, see Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964) (state law regulating
damage awards based on union's peaceful secondary activities superseded by Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §' 187 (1982)); Marine Eng'rs
Beneficial Ass'n v. Interlake Steamship Co., 370 U.S. 173, 184-85 (1962) (state
court lacks jurisdiction to hear dispute between petitioner labor union and re-
spondents whose employees were not members of petitioner union yet whose vessels
were picketed by petitioner as such dispute is arguably within jurisdiction of NLRB);
See generally Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited 85 HARV. L. REV. 1337 (1972);
Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered. The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72
COLUM. L. REV. 469 (1972) for general discussion of Garmon and its effects on
state labor legislation.
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rules and decisions. 64 In Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton,65 a striking
union persuaded customers of the struck employer to refrain from
doing business with that employer for the duration of the strike. 66
While such action is not prohibited under section 8 of the NLRA,
an Ohio state law barred the "making of direct appeals to a struck
employer's customers or suppliers to stop doing business with the
struck employer." ' 67 The district court held and the court of appeals
affirmed for the employer. 6 The United States Supreme Court,
however, vacated the lower courts' decisions holding that the state
law frustrated a congressional desire to leave unions free to persuade
others legally to boycott a struck employer. 69 This activity, the Court
held, "formed an integral part of [the union's] effort to achieve its
bargaining goals during negotiations with the [employer]. Allowing
its use is a part of the balance struck by Congress between the
conflicting interests of the union, the employees, the employer and
the community. ' 70 Thus, because of a congressional desire to leave
such behavior free from all regulation, the state law is preempted. 7'
Preemption of this type, based on the concern that "the [appli-
cation of state law by] state courts would restrict the exercise of
rights guaranteed by the Federal Act ' 72 as opposed to concern for
the jurisdiction of the NLRB is seen also in Lodge 76 v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Commission.73 In Lodge, during the course
of bargaining over terms for the renewal of a collective bargaining
agreement, the employer made changes which included elimination
of union dues checkoff, the union's office in the plant and union
lost time. 74 The employer also announced its intention to implement
a forty-hour work week and an eight-hour day. 75 In response, union
members engaged in "concerted refusal to work overtime." ' 76 The
employer filed an action with the NLRB claiming union violation
64. Lodge 76 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 144
(1976); NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971).
65. 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
66. Id. at 253-54.
67. Id. at 255.
68. Id. at 256.
69. Id. at 259.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 644 (1958).
73. 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
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of section 8(b)(3) of the NLRA.77 The NLRB found no violation. 78
The employer also brought an action before the Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relations Commission alleging violation of the state unfair
labor practice law.79 The Commission, holding that it was not
preempted from acting by the NLRA, found for the employer and
enjoined the union from continuation of its concerted action. 0 The
order was affirmed by the Wisconsin Circuit Court' and also by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court.8 2
The United States Supreme Court, recalling its decision in Morton,83
again recognized the importance of respective union and employer
self-help in labor negotiations and determined that "[w]hether self-
help economic activities are employed by employer or union, the
crucial inquiry regarding pre-emption is the same: whether 'the
exercise of plenary self-help would frustrate effective implementation
of the [NLRA's] processes.' "84 Finding that enforcement of the
Wisconsin ruling in the instant case would have such a frustrating
effect, the Court reversed the state decision. 5 Thus, preemption
exists not only where primary jurisdiction rests with the NLRB but
also where Congress desires that an activity, such as the concerted
refusal to work overtime, remain free from both state and federal
regulation .S6
77. Id. at 135.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 135-36.
81. Id. at 136.
82. 67 Wis. 2d 13, 226 N.W.2d 203 (1975).
83. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text for discussion of Teamsters
Local 20 v. Morton.
84. Lodge 76 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. at 147-
48 (quoting Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 380
(1969)).
85. Lodge 76 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. at 155.
"Such regulation by the State is impermissible because 'it stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.' " Id. at 150-51 (quoting Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 542 (1945)).
86. 427 U.S. at 149. For other decisions dealing with the Congressional intent
to leave certain areas unregulated, thus preempting state action in these areas, see
Hanna Mining Co. v. Marine Eng'rs, 382 U.S. 181, 187 (1965) (an activity neither
"protected nor prohibited" under NLRA may, nevertheless, be exempt from state
regulation); NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. 488, 489 (1960) (activity protected
from state regulation where Congress intends such activity to be "unrestricted by
any governmental power to regulate" and to be an "economic weapon in reserve,
... actual exercise [of which] on occasion by the parties, is part and parcel of
the system that the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts have recognized"); Illinois v.
Federal Tool, 90 L.R.R.M. 2536, 2538 (1975) (employer has right to hire replacements
for striking employees as such "constitutes an important economic weapon left to
the employer by Congress when it struck the balance of power between labor and
management" thus preempting state interference).
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C. Exceptions to the Doctrine
Chief among the exceptions to the preemption doctrine are: (1)
areas where the NLRB has jurisdiction but declines to exercise it,
thus permitting state agencies and courts to assume jurisdiction;87
and (2) activities which are "a merely peripheral concern of the
Labor Management Relations Act .. . [or touch] interests so deeply
rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of
compelling congressional direction, [the Court] could not infer that
Congress had deprived the States of the power to act." 88
Where a state assumes jurisdiction over a labor law case, such
action must be based on a court's careful and correct determination
that the case is one the NLRB would decline to hear.8 9 Some states
have decided that state courts should not assume jurisdiction until
the NLRB actually has declined jurisdiction. 9° Other states, however,
require only a determination that the NLRB would not hear a case
based on published decisions and standards. 91 In either case, inter-
87. 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1)-(2) (1982) (NLRB may decline to assert jurisdiction
over any matter where it finds effect on commerce to be too insubstantial to
warrant its attention; rule is limited, however, as Board must exercise jurisdiction
over any dispute under standards prevailing on August 1, 1959). See supra note
8 for discussion of NLRB jurisdiction, functions and powers. See generally 10
Employment Coordinator (Research Instit. of America) LR-11,901.1 (1984) (dis-
cussion of NLRB jurisdiction).
88. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243-44; see also Drapkin & Davis, Health and Safety
Provisions in Union Contracts: Power of Liability?, 65 MINN. L. REv. 635, 649
(1978) (states not totally precluded from labor legislation as may undertake regulation
of "behavior that is peripheral to the policies sought to be promoted by federal
law particularly when the regulated conduct is traditionally a matter of deeply
rooted local concern").
89. Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians Local v. Broadcast Serv. of
Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 256 (1965) ("[ajlthough a state court may assume
jurisdiction over labor disputes over which the National Labor Relations Board
has, but declines to assert, jurisdiction, . . there must be a proper determination
of whether the case is actually one of those the Board will decline to hear") (citing
Hattiesburg Bldg. Trades Council v. Broome, 377 U.S. 126).
90. Colorado State Council of Carpenters v. District Court of Larrimer County,
155 Colo. 54, 56, 392 P.2d 601, 601-02 (1964) (state court may not assume jurisdiction
until NLRB has declined to do so); Continental Slip Form Builders, Inc. v. Local
227, 195 Kan. 572, 408 P.2d 620, 626 (1965) (jurisdiction must be affirmatively
declined by NLRB before state may assume jurisdiction); Stryjewski v. Brewery &
Beer Distrib. Drivers, 426 Pa. 512, 518-19, 233 A.2d 264, 268 (1969) (pending
actual declination to act by NLRB, state court should not assume jurisdicition).
91. Russell v. Elec. Workers Local 569, 64 Cal. 2d 22, 25, 409 P.2d 926, 928,
48 Cal. Rptr. 702 (1966) (no requirement of prior application to Board; need only
demonstrate Board would decline jurisdiction); accord Smith v. Noel, 24 Ohio Op.
2d 159, 161-62, 188 N.E.2d 195, 197-99 (Ct. of Comm. Pleas 1963). For a discussion
of this issue which goes beyond the scope of this note, see Aaron, The Labor-
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pretation is based on section 14(c)(2) of the NLRA92 which provides
that nothing in the NLRA prohibits state courts or agencies from
assuming jurisdiction over labor disputes which the Board declines
to hear, thus providing an exception to the application of the
preemption doctrine. 93 The second major exception occurs where the
issue is a matter of overriding state concern. 94 Determination of
whether such a state interest exists entails a balancing of the local
importance of the issue being dealt with by the state against the
impact such state action would have on uniform application of the
federal regulatory scheme. 95 Areas of state concern include the pro-
tection of private property 96 and the protection of state citizens from
actual or threatened violence. 97
Also included in this exempted category are defamation actions
as addressed in Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114. 98
In Linn, an employer's official filed a defamation action based on
state law against a union, two union officials and an employee. 99
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1086 (1960);
Hanley, Federal-State Jurisdiction in Labor's No Man's Land: 1960, 48 GEO. L.J.
709 (1960).
92. 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(2) (1982).
93. Id. ("[niothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to prevent or bar any
agency or the courts of any State or Territory . . . from assuming and asserting
jurisdiction over labor disputes over which the Board declines . . . to assert ju-
risdiction").
94. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243-44 ("due regard for the presuppositions of our
embracing federal system ... has required us not to find withdrawal from the
States of power to regulate where the . . . touched interests [are] so deeply rooted
in local feeling and responsiblity that, in the absence of compelling congressional
direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power
to act").
95. International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Jones, 460 U.S. 669, 676-77
(1983).
96. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters,
436 U.S. 180 (1978) (state court has jurisdiction over trespass action brought against
union picketing); Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958) (legitimate
state interest basis for enjoining mass picketing and accompanying threats of
violence); Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S.
740 (1942) (state may enjoin mass picketing, threats of bodily injury and property
damage, obstruction of streets and public roads, blocking of entrance to and egress
from factory, and picketing of employees homes).
97. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369,
386 (1969) (state interest in preventing violence and threats of violence "is compelling
and such conduct may be enjoined by state courts"); Automobile Workers v.
Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); Ackerman v. Int'l Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's
Union, 187 F.2d 860 (1951) (state correctly assumed jurisdiction where employees
instituted threatening tactics against alleged strikebreakers during strike); see also
Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953) (state may exercise
jurisdiction where employees are threatened with violence).
98. 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
99. Id. at 55-56.
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Prior to this action the employer had filed an unfair labor practice
charge with the NLRB alleging violation of section 8(b)(1)(A)' °° -
the intentional circulation of false statements during an organizational
campaign.' 10 When the Regional Director of the NLRB refused to
issue a complaint against the union,'0 2 the union and its officials
sought to have the court action dismissed asserting that the NLRB
had exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter at issue. 03 The
Supreme Court held that while strict application of Garmon would
dictate preemption of the state action in favor of exclusive NLRB
jurisdiction"°4 such application Was undesirable here. 05 Given the
facts that: (1) the intentional circulation of defamatory statements,
the underlying conduct in Linn, is not protected by the NLRA and,
therefore, presents no risk that a state court would regulate conduct
Congress sought to protect;'0 6 (2) the protection of residents from
malicious libel is an overriding state interest "deeply rooted in local
feeling and responsibility;"''07 and (3) there was little risk that, in
the given situation, a state cause of action would impinge on the
uniform application of the national labor policy, 08 the Court held
that a state remedy was available.' °9
A strict application of Garmon similarly was rejected in Farmer
v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters."10 In this case, a union member
filed an action in state court seeking damages for the intentional
infliction of emotional distress against a union and certain union
officials."' Although the trial court awarded damages to the member, 2
the appeals court reversed, holding that the "state courts had no
100. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A)(1982). See supra note 58 for discussion of this
section of NLRA.
101. Linn v. United Plant Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. at 56-57.
102. Id. at 57.
103. Id. at 56.
104. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text for discussion of Garmon
doctrine.
105. Linn v. United Plant Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. at 60-61.
106. Id. at 61. NLRB's determination based on § 8 of NLRA (29 U.S.C. § 158)
concerned with whether statements were misleading or coercive and how they affected
organizational campaign. 282 U.S. at 63. State action concerned with defamatory
nature of statements and affect on plaintiff. Id.
107. Id. at 61-62.
108. Id. at 63.
109. Id. at 67. The holding was limited to state damage actions where defamatory
statements were published with knowledge or reckless disregard of their falsity. Id.
at 65.
110. 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
111. Id. at 293.
112. Id. at 294.
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jurisdiction over the complaint since the 'crux' of the action con-
cerned employment relations and involved conduct arguably subject
to the jurisdiction" of the NLRB."13 The Supreme Court recognized
that the conduct alleged in the case might form the basis for an
unfair labor practice and that strict application of Garmon would
dictate federal preemption on the ground of exclusive NLRB juris-
diction.11 4 The Court, however, rejected this strict application, stating
"that inflexible application of the [Garmon] doctrine is to be avoided,
especially where the State has a substantial interest in regulation of
the conduct at issue and the State's interest is one that does not
threaten undue interference with the federal regulatory scheme."' 15
Finding that the NLRA does not protect an individual from the
"outrageous conduct" complained of by the union member and
recognizing the existence of a substantial state interest in protecting
its citizens from such conduct, the Court held that the state court
had jurisdiction over the tort action.1 6
It is extremely difficult, however, to develop any standards which
may be applied uniformly to determine when an exception to the
preemption doctrine applies." 7 For this reason, the application of
the doctrine to all areas, including the labor field, has been criticised
for its ad hoc nature." 8 Generally, the courts will consider the unique
factors of each given case" 19 and "the decision to pre-empt federal
and state court jurisdiction [in favor of NLRB jurisdiction] over a
given class of cases... [will] depend upon the nature of the particular
interests being asserted and the effect upon the administration of
national labor policies of concurrent judicial and administrative rem-
edies." 20
113. Id. at 294-95.
114. Id. at 302.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 302-05.
117. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
118. "It has been suggested that the Court draws the line between the federation
and the states where it thinks it wise, without significant regard to congressional
intent. The Court's reaction to the state legislation's desirability possesses greater
influence than the metaphysical sign-language of 'occupation of the field."' Shifting
Perspectives, supra note 16, at 635 n.77; see also Cramton, Pennsylvania v. Nelson:
A Case Study In Federal Preemption, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 85, 87 (1958); Powell,
Supreme Court Decisions on the Commerce Clause and the State Police Power
1910-1914, Pt. 11, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 28, 48 (1922) (discussion of lack of uniformity
in Court's preemption decisions).
119. See supra note 16 for discussion of difficulty presented by application of
strict guidelines in preemption cases.
120. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 180 (1967).
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III. Plant Closing Statutes
To date, statutes setting forth requirements for the closing or
relocating of a plant or factory have been passed by the states of
South Carolina,1 2 1 Wisconsin,122 Maine, 23 and Massachusetts. 2 4 Each
statute requires the employer to provide notification of an intention
to close or relocate any of its operations within or without the
particular jurisdiction.' 21
Under South Carolina law, employers in the state who require
advance notice of an employee's intention to quit are themselves
required to give at least two weeks notice of an intention to "quit
work" or shutdown.'26 The employer is excused from the notice
requirement if the shutdown is caused by an unforeseen accident,'27
or by "some act of God or of some public enemy."' 28 The fine im-
posed for failure to comply with the statute may be as high as $5,000,
121. S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-40 (Law. Co-op. 1977).
122. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 109.07 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
123. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 625-B (1984-1985).
124. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 182, ch. 151A, § 71 (Michie/Law. Co-op
1984-1985). Connecticut also has what is known as a "plant closing statute" but
it mandates only continued health insurance coverage for 90 days after a closing
or out-of-state relocation, thus, it does not fall under the "notice" coverage with
which this Note is concerned. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 83-451 (West Appendix
Pamphlet 1984).
125. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 625-B (6) (West Supp. 1984-1985); MASS.
ANN. LAWS, ch. 149, § 182, ch. 151A, § 71B (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1984-1985);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-40 (Law. Co-op. 1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 109.07(1) (West
Supp. 1984-1985). See also supra note 4 for discussion of this requirement.
126. All employers of labor in this State requiring notice from any employee
of the time such employee will quit work shall give notice to its employees
of its purpose to quit work or shutdown by posting in each room of
its building not less than two weeks in advance or the same length of
time in advance as is required by it of its employees before they may
quit work a printed notice of such purpose, stating the date of the
beginning of the shutdown or cessation from work and the approximate
length of time the continuous shutdown is to continue. But they are not
required to do so when the shutdown is caused by reason of some
unforeseen accident to machinery or by some act of God or of the public
enemy.
Any employer of labor subject to the provisions of this section failing
to post notice in the manner herein provided, shall be subject to a fine
of not exceeding five thousand dollars, upon conviction, and in addition
thereto shall be liable to each and every one of his employees for such
damages as such employee may suffer by reason of such failure to give
such notice.
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and, in addition, the employer may be liable to each employee for
damages suffered due to the failure to supply notice. 29
In Wisconsin, an employer with more than 100 employees who
plans to move a plant either inside or outside the state or to close
a plant entirely must send written notice of such intent to the
Wisconsin Department of Labor sixty days prior to the move or
closing. 30 Additionally, notice must be given to any affected em-
ployees, any collective bargaining representatives and the clerk of
the affected village, city or town. 3' The penalty for failure to comply
with the statutes is set at fifty dollars per affected employee. 32
Maine's statute also is directed at employers with more than 100
employees but is limited to any relocation of greater than 100 miles.'
129. Id.
130. (1) Every employer employing 100 or more persons in this state who
has decided upon a merger, liquidation, disposition or relocation within
or without the state, resulting in a cessation of business operations
affecting 10 or more employees shall promptly notify the department [of
industry, labor and human relations], any affected employe, any collective
bargaining representative of any affected employe, and the clerk of any
town, village, city or county in which the affected place of employment
is located, in writing of such action no later than 60 days prior to the
date that such merger, liquidation, disposition, relocation or cessation
takes place. The employer shall provide in writing all information con-
cerning its payroll, affected employes and the wages and other renu-
meration owed to such employes as the department may require. The
department may in addition require the employer to submit a plan setting
forth the manner in which final payment in full shall be made to affected
employes. The department shall promptly provide a copy of the notice
required under this subsection to the department of development and
shall cooperate with the council for economic adjustment and the
department of development in the performance of their responsibilities
under § 15.157(5) and 560.15.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 109.07(1) (West Supp. 1984-1985).
131. Id.
132. (2) Any employer who violates sub. (1), or fails or refuses to provide
all information or a plan for final payment as the department requires
is guilty of a misdemeanor and may be fined not more than $50 for
each employe whose employment has been terminated as a result of such
merger, liquidation, disposition, relocation or cessation of business op-
erations.
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 109.07 (2) (West Supp. 1984-1985).
133. Notice to employees and municipality. Any person proposing to relocate
a covered establishment outside the State shall notify employees, and the
municipal officers of the municipality where the plant is located, in
writing not less than 60 days prior to the relocation. Any person violating
this provision commits a civil violation for which a forfeiture of not
more than $500 may be adjudged, provided that no forfeiture may be
adjudged if the relocation is necessitated by a physical calamity, or if
the failure to give notice is due to unforeseen circumstances.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625-B(6-A) (West Supp. 1984-1985).
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An employer subject to the statute is required to give sixty days
written notice to employees and municipal officials.14 The statute
provides a maximum $500 penalty3 5 and also indicates that an
employer will be exempt from the notice requirement upon a showing
that unforeseen circumstances prevented it from giving notice. 3 6
The Maine statute'37 mandates a grant of severance pay of one
week's salary for each year of employment except: (1) where the
employer was forced to close or move due to physical calamity;3
(2) where the employer already has an express contract providing
for severance pay; 3 9 (3) where the affected employee accepts a
position at the new location 40 and (4) where an employee has
been employed for less than three years at the time of the closing
or relocation.' 4'
The most recent state plant closing legislation was signed into law
in Massachusetts on July 11, 1984.142 This statute encourages com-




137. Severance Pay. Any employer who relocates or terminates a covered
establishment shall be liable to his employees for severance pay at the
rate of one week's pay for each year of employment by the employee
in that establishment. The severance pay to eligible employees shall be
in addition to any final wage payment to the employee and shall be
paid within one regular pay period after the employee's last full day of
work, notwithstanding any other provisions of law.
Id. § 625-B(2).
138. Mitigation of Severance Pay Liability. There shall be no liability for severance
pay to an eligible employee if (A) relocation or termination of a covered establishment
is necessitated by physical calamity. Id. § 625-B(3)(A).
139. There shall be no liability for severance pay to an eligible employee if (B)
the employee is covered by an express contract providing for severance pay. Id.
§ 625-B(3)(B).
140. There shall be no liability for severance pay to an eligible employee if (C)
that employee accepts employment at the new location. Id. § 625-B(3)(C).
141. There shall be no liability for severance pay to an eligible employee if (D)
that employee has been employed by the employer for less than 3 years. Id. §
625-B(3)(D).
142. Any person utilizing financing issued, insured, or subsidized by a quasi-
public agency of the commonwealth shall agree to accept the following
voluntary standards of corporate behavior, without limiting the inde-
pendent powers and findings required to be made by any such quasi-
public agency.
In the event of a plant closing or partial closing as defined in section
seventy-one A of chapter one hundred and fifty-one A, the company
agrees to make a good-faith effort to provide every employee affected
with the maximum practicable combination of the following: the longest
practicable advance notice in cases where notice is possible and appro-
Spriate; and maintenance of income and health insurance benefits.
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plant closing. 43 Another provision limits consideration for state fi-
nancing, such as the right to issue industrial revenue bonds, 14 to
those companies which join in the agreement. 45 The statute further
provides that workers left unemployed by a plant closing are entitled
to receive three months of health insurance and unemployment
compensation as well as job counseling and retraining. 146
The company shall also, if possible, help to reemploy affected employees.
While no minimum standard is prescribed for these company responses,
the commonwealth expects firms to provide at least ninety days notice
or equivalent benefits whenever possible.
The precise form of said agreement shall be determined by the respective
quasi-public agency.
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 182 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1984-1985).
"Advance notification," a voluntary declaration by an employer, in a
form and manner established by the director, that a plant closing, as
defined in this section, will occur.
"Date of certification," the actual or anticipated date of plant closing
or covered partial closing as determined by the director.
"Date of notification," the date of announcement by the employer or
the director, whichever is earlier, of a plant closing or covered partial
closing as determined by the director.
"Employer," an individual, corporation, or other private business entity,
whether for profit or not-for-profit, except an employer engaged in a
seasonal enterprise as defined by the director, which owns or operates
a facility, at least one year.
"Facility," a plant, factory, commercial business, institution or other
place of employment located in the commonwealth which had fifty or
more employees, as defined in this section, during any month in the six
month period prior to the date of certification.
"Partial closing," a permanent cessation of a major discrete portion of
the business conducted at a facility which results in the termination of
a significant number of the employees of said facility and which affects
workers and communities in a manner similar to that of plant closings.
"Plant closing," a permanent cessation or reduction of business at a
facility which results or will result as determined by the director in the
permanent separation of at least ninety per cent of the employees of
said facility within a period of six months prior to the date of certification
or with such other period as the director shall prescribe, provided that
such period shall fall within the six month period prior to the date of
certification.
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 151A, § 71A (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1984-1985).
143. Id. at ch. 149, § 182.
144. Municipalities issue industrial revenue bonds to aid private corporations
finance various projects including plant construction. A municipality will issue
securities to finance the project and then lease the plant to the corporation. Lease
payments are timed to cover debt service requirements which allows the corporation
to take advantage of the lower borrowing costs available to the municipality as a
result of tax exempt nature of the securities. The general aim of such a program
is a furthering of the public welfare by promoting industrial development. Greenberg,
Municipal Securities: Some Basic Principles and Practices, 9 THE URBAN LAWYER
344-45 (1977).
145. MASS. ANN. LAW ch. 149, § 182 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1984-1985).
146. (a) An employee shall be eligible to receive reemployment assistance
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Similar statutes requiring employers to give advance notice of
factory closings have been proposed in a number of states 47 including
New York. New York Assembly Bill 9528 requires that sixty days
prior notice of any permanent closing be given to employees or
their representatives and to government officials of the city in which
the business to be closed is located.148
Cities also have passed plant closing laws. In Vacaville, California,
one year advance notice is required before a plant may shut down
or relocate,'4 9 and a Philadelphia, Pennsylvania statute mandates
that sixty days advance notice be given to the city, affected employees
and their unions.'50 A violation of the Philadelphia law could result
in an award in the amount of the average daily wage of each
employee affected for each day that notice is not given, to a maximum
benefits with respect to any week of unemployment in his or her eligibility
period, . . . only if the director finds that with respect to such week (1)
the employee has been terminated from their [sic] employment as a result
of a plant closing or covered partial closing, (2) the employee is otherwise
eligible for regular benefits under this chapter, and (3) the employee is
participating in the reemployment assistance program, when such program
is available .... provided that, no reemployment assistance benefits shall
be paid for any week commencing prior to the date of notification as
determined by the director.
Id. ch. 151A, § 71F.
(a) An employee eligible to receive reemployment assistance benefits under
section seventy-one F shall also be eligible to receive health insurance
benefits during his or her eligibility period if (1) the individual was, at
the time of termination covered by an individually purchased health
insurance plan, and (2) the individual is not able to be covered under
any health insurance plan carried by' a member of the family.
For the purpose of this section, the eligibility period shall commence
with the effective week of the claim for regular benefits and end at the
completion of three calendar months, or the completion of the month
during which reemployment was obtained, whichever is less. The payment
of health insurance benefits shall terminate at the end of the month
during which employment was obtained.
Id. ch. 151A, § 71G(a).
147. These states include: Alabama, California, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Mich-
igan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Washington and West Virginia. Miller, Manufacturing Relocations
in the United States, 1969-1975, in PLANT CLOSINGS: PUBLIC OR PRIVATE CHOICES?
at 29-30 (1984).
148. Notwithstanding an inconsistent provision of law, any employer op-
erating an industrial, manufacturing or processing business, which employs
at least fifty persons in one location, shall be required, at least sixty
days prior to the intended permanent closing of such business in the
state, to make a written report to the employees or their representatives
and the elected government officials in the county in which the business
is located.
N.Y. General Assembly Bill H.R. 9528 (March 5, 1984).
149. Vacaville, Cal. Ordinance 1200 (Jan. 24, 1984).
150. PHILADELPHIA CODE tit. 9, ch. 9-1502(1) (1982).
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maximum of sixty days."' If such conduct is found to be intentional,
a court may enjoin the employer from carrying out the closing or
relocation until the proper notice is given.'
IV. The Area of Conflict
A. The NLRB, the NLRA and Plant Closing Statutes
Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA 153 has been interpreted as requiring
a company to give a union reasonable notice of a decision to close
a plant in order to provide the opportunity for meaningful bargaining
between labor and management.' 5 4 As a result, it has become the
practice of employers to "give a union at least four weeks (and
probably more) notice so they will not be held to have given in-
sufficient prior notice."' 55 Thus, when disputes arise regarding the
failure to give notice or from the sufficiency of the notice given,
the NLRB will assume jurisdiction. 156
In NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc.,'57 the company undertook a
plant relocation without notifying the employees at that plant or
their union.' The Second Circuit, holding that such action violated
section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA,5 9 stated that a decision to move is a
discretionary management function and, therefore, is not a required
151. Id. ch. 9-1504.
152. Id.
153. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
154. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). The issue as to what such bargaining must
encompass is the subject of much debate, ranging from calls for bargaining as to
the decision to close to limiting such discussion to effects of the closure or relocation.
See Gacek, The Employers Duty to Bargain on Termination of Unit Work, 32
LAB. LAW J. 659-78, 699-724 (1983) [hereinafter cited as The Employers Duty];
Miller, Shall We Shut 'Er Down?, in LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS at 130-50 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Miller].
155. TOWNLEY & UPDIKE'S PERSONNEL PRACTICES NEWSLETTER 3 (May 1984)
(available from Townley & Updike, 405 Lexington Ave., New York, N.Y.); see
also Miller, supra note 109, at 140 ("lilt is important to give adequate notice prior
to the time a final decision is made").
156. See NLRB v. Die Supply Corp., 393 F.2d 462, 467 (lst Cir. 1968) ("[wlhen
the company ... moved its plant to a nearby location .. .it had an obligation
to notify the union of the move and bargain collectively with it with reference to
the transfer of employees and other effects of the move"); Cooper Thermometer
v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 684, 688 (2d Cir. 1967) ("the Board may reasonably interpret
§ 8(a)(5) . . . as requiring an employer relocating his plant .. . to give reasonable
notice to a recognized union").
157. 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961).
158. Id. at 216-17.
159. Id. at 217 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976)).
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subject of collective bargaining.16' However, once such a decision
has been made it becomes subject to section 8(a)(5) which "requires
that notice of it be given to the union so that negotiators could
then consider the treatment due to those employees whose conditions
of employment would be radically changed by the move. 1 ,61 Thus,
an employer who decides to move must comply with the notice
standard as mandated by the federal statute.'
62
Pursuant to its statutory authority,' 63 the NLRB has dealt with
disputes over what constitutes "reasonable notice."' 64 In Creasy
Co.,' 65 the Board decided that, in certain circumstances, 66 as where
the employer deals in fresh produce, 67 giving notice one week prior
to a closing is reasonable and sufficient under section 8(a)(5). 168 The
Creasy decision is important because the Board acted pursuant to
its authority to decide issues involving the development of labor
relations law. 169 Therefore, state and local statutes dealing with notice
160. Id. at 221.
161. Id. This same decision also implied that some form of formal notice is
required. Id. This corresponds with the written notice requirements of the afore-
mentioned city and state statutes. See supra notes 125-49 and accompanying text
for discussion of these requirements.
162. See supra notes 153-61 and accompanying text for discussion of federal
statute requirment.
163. See supra note 8 for discussion of NLRB's authority; supra notes 153-61
for discussion of NLRB's assumption of jurisdiction in regard to notice complaints.
164. See Whitehead Brothers, 263 N.L.R.B. 895, 897 (1982) (no notice is in-
sufficient); National Car Rental Sys., Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. 159, 162-63 (four days
insufficient); Brown Truck & Trailer Mfg. Corp., 106 N.L.R.B. 999, 1001-03 (1953)
(no notice given; implication fifteen days insufficient.)
165. 268 N.L.R.B. 219 (1984).
166. Id. This dispute arose when respondent, Creasy Co., decided, in late Sep-
tember, 1982, to close its produce division which had incurred losses throughout
the year. The closing date was set for late November, 1.982. In late October this
date was changed to November 5. On November 1 respondent informed its customers
of the imminent closing. On the same date company employees heard of the closing
date and informed their union's business agent. The union brought a complaint
before the NLRB charging the company had violated section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA
by failing to adequately notify the union of the impending closure. The Board
found for respondent. The specific circumstances the Board looked to were: 1) the
company dealt in perishable produce, had a large inventory and showed the frequency
with which a sharp decrease in business follows an announced intent to close; 2)
custom of trade evidence that a closing company's competitor's move swiftly in
taking away that company's customers resulting in inability to dispose of perishable
inventory; 3) union was not the only entity not informed-company told no one;




169. See supra notes 149, 202-03 and accompanying text for discussion of the
Vacaville statute.
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requirements, 70 and most importantly, those stipulating notice to a
union,'' arguably, present a conflict with federal labor regulations
as provided by the NLRA. 72 Thus, according to Garmon,'73 these
statutes are invalid in light of the preemption doctrine. 74
There have been no challenges to state plant closing statutes
brought by individual employers. 75 However, in an action brought
by the local Chamber of Commerce, a Pennsylvania court held that
a Pittsburgh plant closing ordinance was invalid. 76 This ordinance
set a variable advance notice period of 90 days for 50 to 100
employees, 180 days for 101 to 500 employees and 270 days for
501 employees or more." 77 Additionally, the ordinance covered any
layoffs involving fifteen percent or more of a company's workforce.'
78
In addition to finding that the city lacked the authority under its
Home Rule Charter to pass such legislation,1 79 the court found that
the ordinance's requirement of written notice "setting forth the
employer's reasons for its decision of closing, relocating or reducing
operations, . . . and the effects thereof" conflicted with federal
labor policy. 80 Since it is "for the NLRB to determine not only
the rights, but also the remedies to effectuate the federal labor
policy," 18 when such rights are the subject of local laws, these local
laws are necessarily preempted by federal labor law and, therefore,
are invalid.8 2
170. See supra notes 121-52 and accompanying text for discussion of these statutes.
171. See, e.g., N.Y. Assembly Bill H.R. 9528 (1984); PHILADELPHIA CODE tit.
9, ch. 9-1502(1); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 109.07(l))(West Supp. 1984-1985) The
requirement of notice to a union necessarily brings the statutes under the NLRA's
coverage. See TOWNLEY & UPDIKE'S PERSONNEL PRACTICES NEWSLETTER 13-14 (June,
1984) (available from Townley & Updike, 405 Lexington Ave., New York, N.Y.)
("now that there is a plant closing statute that requires advance notice to a union,
the stage is set for a clear argument that this requirement violates long-standing
federal pre-emption principles").
172. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text for discussion of the "arguably
protected" standard.
173. 359 U.S. 236 (1959). See supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text for
discussion of NLRA's exclusive jurisdiction.
174. See supra notes 43-86, 153-74 and accompanying text for situations justifying
application of preemption doctrine.
175. See TOWNLEY & UPDIKE'S PERSONNEL PRACTICES NEWSLETTER 8 (October
1983) (available from Townley & Updike, 405 Lexington Avenue, New York, N.Y.).
176. Smaller Mfrs. Council v. Pittsburgh, No. GD 83-11245, Court of Common
Pleas (Allegheny County 1983).
177. Pittsburgh, Pa., Ordinance No. 21 (1983).
178. Id.
179. Smaller Mfrs. Council, supra note 176, at 3.
180. Id. at 6.




On appeal, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania rejected
the lower court's invalidation of the city ordinance on preemption
grounds.'83 Stating that the ordinance dealt with "peripheral concerns
that are not directly involved in labor-management relations,' ' 84 the
court held the ordinance to be outside the reach of federal preemp-
tion. 85 This holding is implausible in light of the NLRA notice
requirement 86 and the fact that "[iut has been consistently ruled
that section 8(a)(5) of the Taft-Hartley Act requires employers to
give the employees reasonable notice of an intended plant shut-
down.' 18 7 The NLRB's assumption of jurisdiction over suits regarding
federal notice requirements illustrates and emphasizes exclusive fed-
eral 'control of the area and demands the preemption of state or
local notice legislation.'88 In addition, the commonwealth court seems
to ignore Garmon's 89 holding which prohibits state and local leg-
islation of matters not only directly related to labor-management
relations but also of any controversy arguably subject to NLRA
provisions.' 90 Thus, the Pittsburgh ordinance should be preempted
by federal labor law.191
183. Smaller Mfrs. Council v. Council of the City of Pittsburgh, No. 2473, slip
op. at 6 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 24, 1984). The court affirmed the lower court's
finding that the notice ordinance violated the city's home rule charter. Id. at 10.
184. Id. at 7.
185. Id.
186. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982). See supra notes 7, 153-62 and accompanying
text for discussion of the federal legislation. The court itself recognizes the weakness
of its preemption holding as it states, "[i]f the questions of preemption were the
sole one [sic] in this case, we would remand for further findings of fact on this
issue." Smaller Mfrs. Council v. Council of the City of Pittsburgh, No. 2473, slip
op. at 10 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 24, 1984).
187. Smaller Mfrs. Council v. Council of the City of Pittsburgh, No. 2473, slip
op. at 13 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 24, 1984) (Colins, J., concurring in result); see
also First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (employers have
duty, under NLRA, to notify affected employees and their representatives of decision
to close plant).
188. See supra notes 165-91 and accompanying text for discussion of these cases.
See also Smaller Mfrs. Council v. Council of the City of Pittsburgh, No. 2473,
slip op. at 14 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 24, 1984) (Colins, J., concurring in result)
(Pittsburgh's plant closing legislation must "yield to the exclusive primary com-
petence of the [NLRBr") (quoting San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959)).
189. See supra notes 57-59.
190. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text for discussion of the decision
in Garmon; see also Smaller Mfrs. Council v. Council of the City of Pittsburgh,
No. 2473, slip op. at 14 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct 24, 1984) (Colins, J., concurring
in result) ("controlling factor in determining whether an act is specifically allowed
or forbidden by the [NLRBI is . . .whether the area is arguably within the purview
of the Board's jurisdiction").
191. Where it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which
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B. Overwhelming State or Local Interest
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania appears to have decided
that the existence of an overriding local interest validates city plant
closing legislation. 192 In fact, a compelling state or local interest may
indeed provide a means for negating or preventing application of
the preemption doctrine in a given situation. 193 For example, state
legislation regarding a compelling state interest may stand regardless
of its possible conflict with federal rules. 94
This argument considers the state's interest in insuring the welfare
of its citizens. 195 The closing of a plant obviously has a negative
a state purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the [NLRA], or
constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, due regard for the federal
enactment requires that the state jurisdiction must yield. To leave the
States free to regulate conduct so plainly within the central aim of federal
regulation involves too great a danger of conflict between power asserted
by Congress and requirements asserted by state law.
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959); see also
Smaller Mfrs. Council v. Council of the City of Pittsburgh, No. 2473, slip op. at
12 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 24, 1984) (Colins, J., dissenting) (upholding Common
Pleas Court holding that local plant closing legislation is preempted by federal
labor law).
192. Smaller Mfrs. Council v. Council of the City of Pittsburgh, No. 2473, slip
op. at 7 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 24, 1984) ("[tlhe City has a proper concern for
the failure of businesses, the loss of jobs and the determination of neighborhoods,
concerns about which, we believe, it can legislate").
193. See supra notes 87-120 for discussion of exceptions to application of the
preemption doctrine.
194. "The pre-emption doctrine presents a conflict between two strong policies-
the policy of uniform federal regulation of labor relations and the policy of local
interests. A compelling state or municipal interest can override the pre-emption
doctrine. This will be the real battle in plant closing cases." TOWNLEY & UPDIKE'S
PERSONNEL PRACTICES NEWSLETTER 7 (Oct. 1983) (available from Townley & Updike,
405 Lexington Ave., New York, N.Y.).
195. States historically have exercised police powers to protect their citizens. See
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157-58 (1978) (where state's exercise
of police power is challenged courts must start with assumption that such exercise
is valid in absence of clear and manifest purpose of Congress to the contrary)
(citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); accord Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); see also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26,
32 (1954) ("[p]ublic safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order
-these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional application
of the police power . . .and do not delimit it"); License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.)
504, 582 (1847) (police powers of state are "nothing more or less than the powers
of government inherent in every sovereignty to the extent of its dominions").
Determination of whether a particular situation is covered by a state's police power
generally is made on a case-by-case basis. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. at 32 ("[ain
attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless, for each case must
turn on its own facts"); Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818 (1879) ("filt is
always easier to determine whether a particular case comes within the general scope
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effect on a community' 96 as it eliminates a source of individual
income for each employee, 97 eliminates a source of taxable income
and corporate taxes receivable by the state and/or local government'"
and, in many cases, adds to the number of welfare recipients. 99 As
Lynn R. Williams, former Acting President of the United Steel-
workers, stated, "[tihe single most devastating economic event that
can befall a worker, his family and his community, is the permanent
closure of his place of employment. A plant closing-particularly
when it is a community's primary employer-is nothing short of
catastrophic.' '200
The best argument for the compelling state interest exception arises
in situations where companies have made use of state or local aid
in establishing or improving a facility in the community.2 10 For
example, the Vacaville, California statute, 202 which is a law of limited
application, requires corporations to make a reasonable effort to
supply one year's advance notice and to provide at least three months
notice of a decision to relocate, layoff or close operations, but
of the [police] power, than to give an abstract definition of the power itself which
will be in all respects accurate").
196. Labor Subcommittee Considers Plant Closing Bill; Prenotification Require-
ment Backed By Steelworkers, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 45, at A-6 (March 7,
1984).
197. Statement on Plant Closing Bill (H.R. 2847) Before House Labor Subcom-
mittee on Employment Opportunities, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 45, at D-4, D-
5 (March 7, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Statement on Plant Closing Bill.]
198. "When a major business closes, a wave of income loss and job loss usually
sweeps through the community. Supplier firms lose contracts, retail stores lose
customers, local governments and school systems lose tax revenues and lay off
employees. A seemingly 'private' decision eventually affects nearly everyone in
town." 129 CONG REC. H.2527 (daily ed. May 2, 1983) (statement of Rep. Ford);
see also Gargan, Plan to Shut Factory Stuns Upstate Village, N.Y. Times, Nov.
14, 1984, at B5, col. 1 (Mayor of Brockport, N.Y. stated, "as soon as they shut
off the furnaces, we'll experience a $40,000 shortfall in the gas and electric franchise
tax. This will mean reassessments and higher taxes.") [hereinafter cited as Gargan].
199. "[C]ase studies indicate that, among dislocated workers, 10 percent to 15
percent find new jobs immediately or accept interplant transfers, 10 percent to 25
percent permanently drop out of the labor force, and 60 percent to 80 percent
tend to experience very long unemployment spells." Littman & Lee, Plant Closing
and Worker Dislocation, in PLANT CLOSINGS: PUBLIC OR PRIVATE CHOICES? at 132
(1984); see also 129 CONG. REC. H.2527 (studies indicate 40% of laid off workers
remain unemployed for 40-60 weeks; 25% remain unemployed for more than a
year).
200. Statement on Plant Closing Bill, supra note 197, at D-1.
201. This would appear to be the reasoning behind the Massachusetts statute
which attaches state financing to the notice requirement. See supra notes 142-46
and accompanying text for discussion of the Massachusetts plant closing statute.
202. Vacaville, Cal., Ordinance 1200 (Jan. 24, 1984). The ordinance reads, in
pertinent part:
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applies only to companies relocating to Vacaville that take advantage
of municipal redevelopment financing. 0 "This type of law is aimed
exclusively at the company that moves in, takes the city's money
and then runs. ' '204
This type of corporate taking has angered city officials in Yonkers,
New York. Otis Elevator Corporation, one of that city's major
employers since the 1880's, threatened to relocate to New Jersey in
the 1960's.205 Hoping to avert a major economic loss, the city agreed
to acquire and later did acquire "approximately 9 1/2 acres of land
in the Urban Renewal area adjacent to the existing plant site in
order to construct a new facility." 2°6 The final $14 million cost of
the plant renewal and modernization project was funded two-thirds
by the federal government while the city and state absorbed the
remaining third.20 7 The total cost to Yonkers was approximately $1.7
million 20 8 plus the additional two million dollar cost of closing various
streets. 209
In 1976, following a hostile takeover of Otis by the United Tech-
nologies Corporation, 210 a pattern of employee layoffs became ev-
Any company obtaining one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or more of
City/Agency financial aid including tax-exempt financing or other forms
of governmental financing for private building/land/equipment (but ex-
cluding governmental/tax-exempt financing for public improvements-
streets, sewer/water lines, lighting, utilities, etc.) must make reasonable
efforts to provide one year's advance notice or sooner if known or
reasonably foreseeable, of plans to reduce, relocate or cease operations
which will effect thirty-five (35) or more jobs of the company's full-
time permanent employees at the Vacaville location.
This section shall not apply to retail sales, seasonal construction, tem-
porary or part-time (20 hours/week or less) employees or to reductions
caused by business failures. In the case of business failures, notice should
be given to affected employees as soon as the closing or sale of the
facility is anticipated or known. The notification of closure or reduction
in force must be given to any collective bargaining representative or, if
none, to any affected employees, and upon request of the City, the
representative, or any affected employees, the employer will enter into
discussions with such employees or bargaining representative and with
the City concerning their proposed reduction or cessation of operations
and its potential impact upon the employees and the local community.
Id. § I(D).
203. Id.
204. TOWNLEY & UPDIKE'S PERSONNEL PRACTICE'S NEWSLETTER, supra note 194,
at 7.








ident. 21' Notice of the decision to close the facility was not given
to employees until November 29, 1982.212 Notice was never given to
city officials despite the fact that the company had made reassurances
to elected officials that it had no intention of closing the Yonkers
plant for six years. 21 3
Under circumstances like those contemplated by the Vacaville
statute,214 and those actually experienced in Yonkers, there is a
compelling local interest as the cities have manifested their investment
in the continued operation of a given plant or business. 215 Where
municipal funding is taken advantage of by a corporation seeking
to further its development and where such monetary outlays are
made to benefit the citizens of the municipality by insuring continued
corporate presence and job security, an argument for finding a
compelling state or local interest exists.21 6 Guaranteeing the continued
211. Id.
212. Id. at D-5, D-6. The employees were given notice that the plant was to
close within a year. While it may be argued that this was a reasonable time period
as required by the NLRA, Yonkers' city officials, particularly Mayor Angelo R.
Martinelli, focused complaints against Otis and United Technologies on the fact
that after large expenditures had been made by the city for the benefit of the
corporation, city officials were never given notice of the company's decision to
close. See supra notes 94-116, 192-94. See also infra notes 213-18 for discussion
of how such local interest may be basis for exception to application of the preemption
doctrine.
213. Statement on Plant Closing Bill, supra note 197, at D-6.
214. See supra notes 94-116, 192-94 and accompanying text for discussion of
compelling local interest as an exception to the preemption doctrine.
215. In Yonkers, this manifestation took the form of the approximately $3.7
million it invested as part of the plan to keep Otis in the city. See supra notes
207-09 and accompanying text. Yonkers' officials claim United Technologies acquired
not only the assets of Otis but also its moral obligation to the city to keep the
factory in operation. N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1983, § 4, at 6, col. 3 ("Yonkers
officials claim Otis Elevator has a moral and contractual obligation to remain in
business because public funds were spent to aid the company"); see also N.Y.
Times, May 15, 1983, § 3, at 8, col. 3 (statement of Mayor Angelo Martinelli)
("[o]nce a company avails itself of the opportunities and economic development
money [offered by a city] its going to have to make a long-term commitment").
But see Local 1330, United Steelworkers v. United States Steel, 631 F.2d 1264,
1279-82 (6th Cir. 1980) (local residents could not claim that local plant had
enforceable obligation to continue operation based merely on long term economic
relationship between the plant and the community). In Vacaville, the investment
of municipal redevelopment funds in a company manifests the city's financial
interest. See supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text for discussion of the Vacaville
statute.
216. See supra note 144 for definition and discussion of industrial development
or revenue bonds and expenditures. The general purpose of such bonds is to foster
economic growth for the benefit of the local community source. Therefore, the
issues arising in connection with the bonds are local in nature. The establishment
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well-being of its citizenry, which is part of the state's police power,217
qualifies as a compelling local interest which justifyies the notice
requirement and prevents application of the preemption doctrine.2 8
It is more difficult to establish a compelling state or local interest
for plant closing statutes which go beyond specific application to
encompass all plant closings. 21 9 In situations like that presented in
Smaller Manufacturers Council, where no municipal financial as-
sistance had been rendered, there existed the difficulty of proving
that the loss of a mere fifty jobs created such an important state
or local interest that justifies overriding the NLRA and disrupting
the scheme of national uniformity of labor regulation. 220 While
proponents of plant closing bills see them as necessary to protect
the worker and his or her community, 22' others argue that such
legislation will have the opposite effect. 222 Instead of fostering eco-
nomic growth, these state statutes would produce economic stagnation
of such financing mechanisms have been upheld despite state bans on lending of
credit to private enterprises. See Wright v. City of Palmer, 468 P.2d 326 (Alaska
1970); Purvis v. Hubbell, 273 Ark. 330, 620 S.W.2d 282 (1981); Wald v. Sarasota
County Health Facilities Auth., 360 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 1978); ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION LAW § 15.08 (1984). Instrumental in making such financing consti-
tutional is the local interest served. See Orange County Indus. Dev. Auth. v. State,
427 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 1983) (county's attempt to issue development revenue bonds
to aid private television station expansion rejected; station did not constitute an
industrial or manufacturing plant and project primarily aided private interest-
public benefits were minimal).
217. See supra note 195 and accompanying text for discussion of state police
powers.
218. See supra notes 94-116, 192-94 & 213-17 for discussion of compelling state
interest as exception to preemption doctrine application. The fact that such a plant
closing has a major impact on a city's citizenry as a whole was seen in Yonkers
where, following the United Technologies/Otis decision to shut down the Yonkers
plant, a candlelight vigil was organized by local officials, clergy and union members
"to commemorate the loss to the community and what the closing of Otis would
mean to the employees and their families." Statement on Plant Closing Bill, supra
note 197, at D-6.
219. "A Vacaville-type statute has a greater claim to a compelling local interest
since it applies only to companies that solicit and accept tax abatements or conces-
sions to relocate to a community. A simple plant closing statute that covers all
closings presents very different considerations." TOWNLEY & UPDIKE'S PERSONNEL
PRACTICES NEWSLETTER, supra note 194, at 7-8.
220. No. 2473, slip op. at 7 (Pa. Commonwealth Ct. Oct. 24, 1984). "Employers
and local chambers of commerce can argue that a history of plant closings and
loss of jobs is not a sufficiently compelling local interest to override federal regulation
under the NLRA. Preemption should prevail .... ." TOWNLEY & UPDIKE'S PER-
SONNEL PRACTICES NEWSLETTER, supra note 194, at 8.
221. See supra notes 195-200 and accompanying text for discussion of the perceived
need for a statutory notice requirement; see also infra notes 235-45 and accompanying
text.
222. See infra notes 223-26 and accompanying text for discussion of opponent's
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because corporations considering a move into an area may reconsider
upon discovering that they would be unable to leave the community
due to the existence of a statute that imposes a penalty for relo-
cating.223 More specifically, notice requirements impinge substantially
on the freedom of enterprise principle upon which our economy is
built.2 24 To set a statutory time limit on notice instead of the variable
"reasonable" time limit imposed by the NLRA, ignores the realities
of the marketplace. 225 For some companies "a one-year notice may
be appropriate; for many others, perhaps most, it will not be. 226
State statutes in this area must be superseded as they destroy the
uniformity of required notice established by the NLRA and enforced
by the NLRB.227
V. The National Solution
The National Employment Priorities Act, 228 a bill proposed in
May, 1983, which deals with the notice issue, offers a solution to
the preemption problem. 229 As proposed, the bill would require
viewpoints.
223. What company would want to move into an area that has substantial
economic penalties for moving out? What entrepreneur would want to
start a business in a community or state that had penalties for changing
locations? Companies interested in profits will always try to settle in
those areas that leave them free to make the basic decisions on when
to shift among products, when to close and when to move.
McKenzie, Business Mobility: Economic Myths and Realities, in PLANT CLOSINGS:
PUBLIC OR PRIVATE CHOICES? at 11, 26 (R. McKenzie ed. 1984).
224. McKenzie, The Case for Plant Closures, in PLANT CLOSINGS: PUBLIC OR
PRIVATE CHOICES? at 205, 211-12 (R. McKenzie ed. 1984).
225. McKenzie, Summary Remarks, in PLANT CLOSINGS: PUBLIC OR PRIVATE
CHOICES? at 309, 312 (R. McKenzie ed. 1984).
226. Id. at 312.
227. See supra notes 154-75 for discussion of NLRA and NLRB coverage of
notice requirement.
228. H.R. 2847, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. (1983), 129 CONG. REC. H.2526 (daily
ed. May 2, 1983).
229. Id. The bill, in pertinent part, states:
(a) Whenever a business concern intends to undertake a change of
operations at an establishment in a State and such business concern
determines, or reasonably should have determined, that the number of
employees at such establishment who will suffer an employment loss in
any eighteen-month period, as a result of such change of operations,
equals or exceeds the lesser of one hundred employees or 15 per centum
of the employees at such establishment, then such business concern shall
give written notice, in accordance with subsection (b), of such intended
change of operations.
(b)(1) The notice required in subsection (a) shall include a statement of
(A) the nature of the establishment at which the change of operations
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
described in subsection (a) is to be undertaken,
(B) the reasons for undertaking such change of operations at such es-
tablishment,
(C) any alternative to undertaking such change of operations,
(D) any request made by such business concern for assistance under
section 204 with respect to such establishment,
(E) the estimated extent of the employment loss which will result from
such change of operations,
(F) any plan to minimize the effects of such change of operations on
employees at such establishment and on any unit of general local gov-
ernment having jurisdiction of the geographical area in which such es-
tablishment is located,
(G) the economic circumstances of such establishment, including the level
of profitability of operations at such establishment, and any plans for
future investment, employment, and production at such establishment,
(H) the economic circumstances of such business concern and the fea-
sibility of transferring employees affected by such change of operations
to other establishments of such business concern, and
(I) the names and addresses of all employees who will suffer an em-
ployement loss as a result of such change of operations.
(2) The notice required ifl subsection (a) shall be given to the Secretary
of Labor, to the employees and any representative of any affected labor
organization at such establishment, and to such units of general local
government as the Secretary may require by rule.
(3)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B) and subparagraph (C),
the notice required in subsection (a) shall be given before the business
concern involved takes any action, in connection with any intended change
of operations, to reduce the weekly wage, or to suspend or terminate
the employment, of any employee and
(i) not later than one year before taking such action, if the number of
employees who will suffer such employment loss exceeds one hundred,
or
(ii) not later than six calendar months before taking such action, if the
number of employees who will suffer such employment loss does not
exceed one hundred.
(B) Upon the request of such business concern, the Secretary may allow
such business concern to give the notice required in subsection (a) at a
time later than the time required in subparagraph (A), but only if the
Secretary finds that an increase in the number of employees at such
establishment within the applicable time period required in such sub-
paragraph, or other circumstances beyond the control of such business
concern, make it impossible for such business concern to comply with
the requirements of such subparagraph.
(C) If in the two-year period beginning on the date of the enactment
of this Act sufficient time does not elapse to permit a business concern
required to give notice under subsection (a) to comply with the applicable
requirement in subparagraph (A), then such business concern shall give
such notice
(i) not later than thirty days after such change of operations begins if
such change of operations begins in the sixty-day period beginning on
the date of the enactment of this Act, or
(ii) not later than thirty days after the date of the enactment of this




to give six months advance notice of a permanent layoff of up to
100 workers.230 An additional six months notice would be required
should more than 100 workers be affected."' The bill further requires
employers to provide "interplant transfer" rights to dislocated work-
ers as well as severance payments and extended health and other
benefits following the closing. 23
2
The passage of federal legislation would conclusively preempt state
plant closing statutes and foster the goals and remedy the ills to
which state and local statutes are directed. 233 However, progress on
the passage of this measure has been slow. 234 A National Employment
Priorities Act has been proposed on a regular basis since 1974.235
The bill cleared the House Labor-Management Relations Committee
(c) Not later than thirty days after the Secretary receives the notice
required in subsection (a), the Secretary shall inform each employee at
the establishment with respect to which such notice is given, of - (1)
all rights such employee may have to receive assistance under section
402 from the business concern involved, and
(2) the protection, services, and assistance available to such employee
under this Act.





233. The legislation addresses a serious and increasingly pervasive problem
in our society: The phenomenon of sudden plant closings, undertaken
without warning to the affected workers and without adequate regard
for the devastating social and economic cost a shutdown can have. The
costs to a community of the closure of a large workplace-whether it
be an automobile factory, a shipyard, or a department store-can be
tremendous. And these costs are exacerbated when the closings occur
without advance notice to the people who are affected by them.
Statements in Support of the National Employment Priorities Act by U. S. Rep-
resentative William D. Ford, reprinted in PLANT CLOSINGS: PUBLIC OR PRIVATE
CHOICES? at 315, 318-19 (R. McKenzie ed. 1984).
234. See infra notes 235-40 and accompanying text for discussion of progress
of National Employment Priorities Act in the House of Representatives.
235. The National Employment Priorities Act was introduced by Rep. William
D. Ford of Michigan in 1974, 1979, 1982 and 1983. In addition to dealing with
notice requirements, the federal bill addresses the issue of federal assistance to
employees. See H.R. 2847, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201 (1983).
(a) The Secretary [of Labor], in conjunction with the National Employer
Priorities Advisory Council, shall implement a comprehensive program
in accordance with subsection (b) to provide assistance to employees who
suffer or may suffer an employment loss at an establishment with respect
to which notice is required under section 301(a) [see supra note 229].
Such program shall include
(1) training programs,
(2) job placement services,
(3) payments for reasonable expenses, not to exceed $600 for each
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in 1983.236 It was the subject of a lengthy series of hearings in early
1984,237 and it still must clear a number of congressional committee
employee, incurred by such employees in connection with searching for
new employment if such employees cannot reasonably be expected to
find such employment in the geographical area in which such establishment
is located,
(4) payments for reasonable expenses incurred by such employees in
connection with moving to a new residence for the purpose of beginning
employment, . . . and
(5) education assistance.
(b)(l) To the extent practicable, the Secretary shall provide assistance
under subsection (a) to employees who may suffer an employement loss,
before such employment loss occurs.
Id.
In addition, the federal bill allows a business concern which obtains the approval
of the Secretary of Labor (H.R. 2847 at § 203(a)) to receive such
financial assistance, on such terms and conditions as the Secretary
deems to be appropriate, as will substantially contribute to the economic
viability of the establishment with respect to which such assistance is
requested. Such financial assistance may include loans, loan guarantees,
interest subsidies, and the assumption by the Secretary of any outstanding
debt of such business concern.
(2) The assumption of any outstanding debt of a business concern by
the Secretary under paragraph (1), with or without recourse, shall be
considered to be a loan made to such business concern.
(3) A loan or loan guarantee shall be made by the Secretary under
paragraph (1) only if the Secretary determines that the interest rate payable
under the terms of such loan or the loan guaranteed, as the case may
be, is reasonable.
(4) No financial assistance shall be provided under paragraph (1) unless
the Secretary determines that substantially equivalent financial assistance
is unavailable to such business concern with respect to such establishment
from any conventional source other than the United States, and that
there is a reasonable likelihood that such business concern will repay the
Secretary the amount of any financial assistance provided under such
paragraph.
(b) The Secretary may provide to a business concern which is eligible
under section 203 such technical assistance, on such terms and conditions
as the Secretary deems to be appropriate, as will substantially contribute
to the economic viability of the establishment with respect to which such
assistance is requested. Such technical assistance may include grants and
contracts for research and development in connection with new production
or marketing techniques which will create new employment opportunities
at such establishment.
H.R. 2847 § 204.
Similar financial assistance would be made available to local governments affected
by a business concern's decision to change operations (H.R. 2847 § 207) and
employers who are not required to give notice under § 301(a) (see supra note 229)
provided the employers obtain the approval of the Secretary of Labor (H.R. 2847
§ 208). Federal aid is also available should it be deemed necessary by the Secretary
of Labor to aid in qualified plant expansion or construction of operations. (H.R.
2847 § 209).
236. Labor Subcommittee Considers Plant Closing Bill, supra note 196, at A-7.
237. Id.
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hurdles, 3 ' including the House Employment Opportunities Subcom-
mittee and the House Banking Subcommittee on Economic
Stabilization 23 9 before finally being put to a vote by the full House.2 40
National legislation may alleviate what has been perceived as an
unreasonable burden on employers, whose ability to compete within
a given state or city has been infringed upon by statutory notice
requirements especially where a non-resident competitor's drive for
profits is unhampered by a similar requirement.24 1 Prevention of the
inherent unfairness resulting from such uneven application forms
the basis of the requirement of national uniformity in the labor
field. 242 Regulation in this area, therefore, is solely within the province
of the federal legislature. 243
This legislation would come at a time when plant closings are an
extremely frequent occurrence in American urban life2 44 and plant
238. Subcommittee proponents of the Bill are concerned with plant flight, dis-
located workers and the effects on communities abandonded by plants. Plant Closing
Litigation: Hearings on H. 2847 Before the House Subcomm. on Labor-Management
Relations of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Hearing: Subcomm. Labor-Management Relations]; Plant
Closing Litigation: Hearings on H. 2847 Before the House Subcomm. on Em-
ployment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1984) [hereinafter cited as Hearing: Subcomm. Employment Opportunities].
With respect to notice requirements, private business should take responsibility
along the lines of environmental laws which "balance a corporation's profit and
license to operate against the health and welfare of its neighbors .... We have
been protecting the snaildarters by federal law for years, but the dislocated worker
is still an endangered species." Hearing: Subcomm. Labor-Management Relations,
supra, at 2 (statement of Representative William Ford of Michigan). Opponents
concerns focus on the shackling effect of the litigation and a reluctance to allow
government interference in the area. Hearing: Subcomm. Labor-Management Re-
lations, supra at 51 (statement of Representative Marge Roukema of New Jersey)
("I am concerned about the inadvertant or unintended effects of this kind of
legislation leading to a paralysis of capital application and mobility").
239. Hearing: Subcomm. Employment Opportunities, supra note 238.
240. Labor Subcommittee Considers Plant Closing Bill, supra note 196, at A-7.
241. The burden that notice places on a company will vary with the circumstances
of each case. In Creasy, 268 N.L.R.B. 219 (1984), it was the anticompetitive weight
of this burden that resulted in the Board's acceptance of one week's notice.
Opponents to a notice requirement point to this variable nature in arguing against
any specified, definite time period. See supra notes 223-26 and accompanying text
for discussion of this opposition.
242. See supra notes 49-60 and accompanying text for discussion of perceived
need for national uniformity in the development of labor law.
243. Id.
244. "A study conducted by the Brookings Institution and the Small Business
Administration indicates that 4.8 million jobs were eliminated during the first 2
years of the current recession when businesses shut down facilities of all kinds-
factories, mines, retail stores and offices." 129 CONG. REC. H.2526 (daily ed. May
2, 1983).
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closing statutes are viewed as a necessary protection for a potentially
displaced workforce.2 45 James H. Stull, Mayor of Brockport, a small
upstate New York village, echoed the sentiments of a number of
officials and citizens of cities, towns and villages which have been
affected by the closing of large employers2 46 when he called for more
government action in the area, stating, "[e]ither you help industry
or you pay unemployement. ' 247
In Brockport, Owens-Illinois, Inc., reflecting the national trend,
241
announced that "it would close its glass bottle manufacturing plant
[in the village] early next year. ' 249 This action would leave 471 of
the 9700 residents out of work.2 50 The fact that the corporation gave
advance notice of the decision to close provided some financial
mitigation of an otherwise disasterous economic situation. 25 Such
notice gave the village a chance to "fall back and regroup . . .
and get new industry in here. ' 25 2 According to Representative William
D. Ford, however, in most cases, corporations fail to give ample
notice. 253 An example is the termination of 600 employees of the
In the steel industry alone, at least 600 plants or product facilities were completely
shutdown in 1982 while hundreds more suffered partial shutdowns. Labor Sub-
committee Considers Plant Closing Bill, supra note 196 at A-7. In 1983, more than
44,000 steel industry workers were dislocated while approximately three million
manufacturing jobs have been lost between the years 1980 and 1984, the majority
due to permanent plant closings. Id.
245. The current wave of industrial dislocation in America has posed a
portentous challenge ... to the stability of communities and families
.... The crisis has prompted labor unions and community groups to
press for legislation at both the federal and state levels which would
require companies to give notice of unit terminations and provide ade-
quate transfer rights and compensation .... [Sluch legislation is sorely
needed ....
The Employer's Duty, supra note 154, 659.
246. 129 CONG. REC. H.2526 (daily ed. May 2, 1983) (statement of Representative
Ford) ("Governments at every level, business leaders and their organizations, and
academics have all become aware-belatedly-of the problems that these shifts in
investment have created. They are beginning to realize that the improverishment
of millions of formerly productive workers creates dangers for our economy and
our democracy.").
247. Gargan, supra note 198, at B-5, col. 1.
248. See supra note 244 for discussion of nationwide factory closings.
249. Gargan, supra note 198, at B-5, col. 1.
250. Id.
251. Proponents of notice requirements stress that the notice allows "local gov-
ernments, employees and small businesses to plan for and adjust to the loss of
tax revenues, employment, and business which will occur." 129 CONG. REC. H.2527
(daily ed. May 2, 1983).
252. Gargan, supra note 198, at B-5, col. 1 (quoting Mayor James H. Stull).
253. "[O]nly Federal regulation will cause the great majority of businesses to
provide prenotification of plant shutdowns .... Voluntarism has failed .... ." 129
CONG. REC. H.2526 (daily ed. May 2, 1983).
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Atari Corporation with less than one day's notice despite the fact
that the company had been planning to move to Taiwan for almost
one year .54
Federal legislation is the only answer to the notice dilemma. It
would codify a requirement deemed necessary by a number of labor
organizations and interests255 while releasing employers from the
unconstitutional application of variable and disjunctive state labor
legislation .256
V1. Conclusion
Under Garmon, state or local legislatures are prohibited from
providing remedies for actions which either conflict with federal
labor regulations or are of the sort which Congress intended to leave
unregulated. An exception to this rule occurs where the statute deals
with an issue of overwhelming or traditional state or local interests.
Plant closing statutes, such as those which exist in the states of
Maine, Massachusetts and Wisconsin, and cities such as Philadelphia,
provide remedies for subjects arguably, if not directly, covered by
section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA. It is unlikely that the state or local
interest presented by such legislation is of a degree sufficient to
warrant application of the exception.
Continued enforcement of these state and local statutes harms the
integrity of businesses which, owing to their locations, are required
254. Id. In February, 1983, several hundred Atari employees in California were
laid off without notice as the company was moving the division to Hong Kong
and Taiwan. According to one employee the workers were not even allowed to
empty their desks. "It was real sudden. A week earlier ... [the office manager]
told us our jobs were safe, and I'd just bought a car so I could get to work
.... " N.Y. Times, July 19, 1984, at D-1, col. 4. Atari admitted that the move
had been planned in late 1980. Id. at D-23. It is important to note that the Atari
employees had no labor contract and thus would not come under the protection
of the NLRA. As a result, the corporation stated that its move, necessitated by
increased costs at the California plant, was not illegal as "there is nothing in the
law requiring advance notice of layoffs." Id. at D-23.
A number of attorneys claim Atari is an extreme example. Id. at D-23. House
hearings on the federal bill present claims that the majority of corporations approach
the notice issue responsibly, giving as much notice as is reasonable under the
circumstances. Hearing: Subcomm. Labor-Management Relations, supra note 238,
at 212 (statement of Representative Steve Bartlett of Texas); id. at 278 (statements
of F. M. Lunnie, Jr., Ass't. Vice President, Nat'l. Assoc. of Mfrs. and Richard
McKenzie, Prof. Economics, Clemson University).
255. See supra notes 195-200, 233 & 244-54 and accompanying text for discussion
of support for National Employment Priorities Act.
256. See supra notes 49-63, 241-43 and accompanying text for discussion of need
for national uniformity of labor relations laws.
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to release confidential, strategic information as to future business
plans while competitors in other cities or states do not operate under
similar constraints. At the same time, the frequency with which
plants are closed suddenly or moved without warning works undue
hardship on the employees who unexpectedly find themselves in
search of new employment. Legislation which would afford them
ample warning and opportunity to plan their futures is as desirable
as it is necessary.
The passage of federal legislation on the notice issue is the only
possible cure. Congress has delayed far too long and made too little
progress in this area. Further delay should not be allowed. Congress
must act quickly for the benefit of all parties concerned and for
the benefit of the nation.
Joanne K. Guinan
